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Bergman and Diamond (2013) have articulately and accurately identified many of the reasons why, 
and the problems associated with, the identification of people with sickle cell  disease (SCD) as 
“difficult patients.” In our view, however,  by suggesting that this problem is best dealt with through  
an ethics service consultation (ESC), they misconstrue the  source of the difficulties of SCD and fail to 
appreciate the  limitations of bioethics in seeking to improve the health  care experience of people 
living with SCD. We provide empirical data describing an Australian perspective of SCD care, which 
highlights not only the complex issues raised by this illness but the challenges it creates for medical 
decision  making and for bioethics. We suggest that the difficulties of SCD are protean in nature and 
that more can be gained    from thinking again about the limits of bioethics and contemporary 
medicine than it can by seeking solace in clinical ethics consultation.   
The historical, cultural, and political setting of SCD in Australia is somewhat different to that of North 
America  where most of the work cited by Bergman and Diamond  originates. Following the white 
settlement of Australia by  Europeans in 1788 and restrictions on immigration in the  first part of the 
1900s typified by the “White Australia Policy,” the arrival of people from world regions with 
populations who carry the genetic determinants of SCD occurred  only within the past 60 years. This 
has resulted in a heterogeneous group of people who currently access SCD services. The majority of 
people in New South Wales, Australia, identified in the “NSW Haemoglobinopathy Project” 
(Crowther et al. 2013) were born outside of Australia  (78.5%)—with the majority arriving from 
Africa and the  Middle East. Importantly, more than one-third of these people entered Australia 
classified as refugees and 50% had  annual family incomes below the Australian poverty line  
(Melbourne Institute of Applied Economic and Social Research 2010). While these people are subject 
to the racial  prejudices identified by Bergman and Diamond, many of  those with SCD living in 
Australia have also experienced  war, loss, dislocation, disruption, exploitation, and migration; 
continue to experience economic disadvantage, cultural isolation, and cultural and religious 
prejudice in their  adopted homeland; and struggle to negotiate living in a  foreign country without 
fluency in English. There are also  relatively lower numbers of people living with SCD in Australia 
when compared to the United States, Canada, and the  United Kingdom, so comprehensive, 
specialist services either are limited or do not exist. And while there are no Australian studies of 
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clinicians perceptions of drug dependency  or opiate-seeking behaviour by people with SCD, we have  
certainly encountered prejudice among health professionals in our clinical practice and would agree 
with Bergman  and Diamond that this, in addition to the complex medical,  social, and cultural 
context of SCD, contributes to the normative and categorical error of labelling of such people as  
“difficult patients.”   
As has been widely described, prejudicial judgments  frequently arise as a consequence of ignorance. 
In this regard, as Bergman and Diamond make clear, it may indeed  aid in having the narratives of 
patients with SCD properly heard, and this can only positively contribute to the  therapeutic 
interaction. It would be a mistake, however, to expect too much from an ethics consultation, as the 
experience of people with SCD is so different from that of their  health care provider, and from 
experts in clinical ethics, that  it challenges both the processes of medical decision making  and the 
adequacy of clinical ethics.   
In interviews with 12 haematologists involved in the  care of patients with haemoglobin disorders, 
including SCD,  about their clinical decision making and their use of evidence in their practice, we 
found that many clinicians used  “self-referential” strategies, both in their decision making  and in 
their communication. This usually involved clinicians asking themselves what they would do if they 
or their  own child had SCD, or describing to their patient episodes  from their own life that 
appeared to be salient to their experiences with SCD. In both cases the aim was to generate 
empathy and understanding and consolidate the therapeutic relationship. It is arguable, however, 
that achieving  these aims requires more than simply hearing a person’s  story—it also requires 
some shared experience. Inasmuch  as tourists may better understand their destination through  
close observation, through discourse, and through education, they always remain manifestly 
observers. Hearing the  narrative of a patient with SCD, therefore, makes the clinician an informed 
tourist, which is immeasurably important but falls short of the hopes that clinicians may have  when 
they use self-referential strategies to inform and enrich their practice. In this regard it is worthy of 
note that  a study of U.S. haematologists prescribing hydroxyurea in  patients with SCD (Lanzkron et 
al. 2008) demonstrated  higher prescribing rates by non-White doctors, suggesting  that race-
concordant relationships facilitated the complex  interactions needed to commence hydroxyurea.   
So what alternatives are there to ethics consultation?  While we are broadly supportive of the 
approaches that  Bergman and Diamond advocate for meaning-making in  clinical care, we suggest 
that examination of disability theory and disability bioethics provides a particularly useful  for means 
for understanding the situation confronting difficult patients with SCD. First, this is because they 
challenge the very notion that it is even possible to imagine  what it is like to be someone else, 
particularly someone  with disability. In Disability Bioethics: Moral Bodies, Moral  Difference, Jackie 
Leach Scully (2008) notes that contemporary Anglo-American bioethics relies, almost entirely, upon  
“able-bodied” frames of reference in developing an understanding of health and illness and of 
specific issues such as  genetic testing, end-of-life care, and access to community-based care. 
Normative positions about what treatments  should or should not be offered to people with physical 
and  mental disability therefore inevitably embody the ontologies and epistemologies external to 
their own lived experiences. Furthermore, while Scully is sympathetic with calls  for both 
practitioners and bioethicists to be more imaginative and empathetic, she notes that because these 
rest  upon an individuals’ own experiences and circumstances,  any effort to understand a patient’s 
reality is ultimately  compromised by differences in gender, age, culture, religion, and/or class. In the 
case of people with SCD, all  of these exist. This problem is twofold. First, it is a problem that we 
have few, if any, doctors, nurses, allied health  personnel, and health bureaucrats who speak 
languages  other than English, who have experienced discrimination,  or who have been threatened 
by war, poverty, or injustice,  and it is a problem that we do not have adequate health  services for 
people with SCD. (Indeed, the reality of Australian medical care is that most practitioners are white, 
English speaking, non-refugee, and Christian and come from  privileged backgrounds.) But it is also a 
problem if we fail  to comprehend the enormity of these differences and believe, perhaps for the 
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right reasons, that Western institutional “solutions”—like ethics committees—are the answer,  or 
even that we can adequately understand the difficulties that people with SCD may face. As Rosalind 
Diprose, a  feminist philosopher quoted by Scully in Disability Bioethics,  notes of claims of 
understanding in academic or public discourse, “Any dialogue which claims absolute understanding 
of the other is, in effect, a monologue which subsumes  differences under norms already in place. 
The social fabric may alter as an effect of dialogue and action but the  inequalities within it will 
remain in place” (Scully 2008, 39).   
But the literature on disability is also useful for thinking about the difficulties of SCD because it 
reminds us  that disability is simultaneously an embodied experience, a  April, Volume 13, Number 4, 
2013 ajob 23  The American Journal of Bioethics  biological phenomenon, and a consequence of 
social relationships and practices. This points to the necessity for both  practitioners and bioethicists 
to recognize what it is about  SCD, and about people living with SCD, that is so difficult.  Ultimately, 
this is because the experience of SCD is, at once,  a disabling biological condition causing pain, 
infertility, and  organ failure, a disease more prevalent within the communities of the South than the 
North (and so relatively neglected  by the latter), and an illness experience inscribed with the  
cultural experience of poverty, conflict, movement, colonization, dispossession, and discrimination. 
Thus, while  ethics consultation may assist with medical decision making  in institutional settings 
(making them more reflective and  more inclusive of alternative cultural frames of reference), it  
does nothing to address the social determinants of ill health  in people with SCD, change 
government policies around  the management of illness in refugees, increase the amount  of 
research dollars committed to haemoglobinopathies in  resource-poor communities, or contribute to 
international  discussions around the plight of people escaping conflict,  economic insecurity, and 
cultural disintegration. The benefits of ethics consultation, therefore, are very limited.   
In our view, while we support any processes that encourage care, critical thinking, and moral 
imagination in  health care settings, we believe that the care of people with  SCD would be best 
served by thinking more deeply about  what it is that makes them so “difficult” and by critical 
examination of the political, social, and cultural determinants  of their experience of illness and of 
health care. Bioethics,  likewise, would be best served not by rehearsing calls for  clinical ethics 
services constrained by the walls of institutions and by the normative restrictions of analytical 
philosophy, but by openness to the insights and humility gained  by a sensitive reading of disability 
and feminist bioethics.  
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